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and a selective bibliography of articles devoted to some aspects of these organizations.
The survey of actual operation and practices of European organizations as
offered by this Yearbook is an invaluable source of otherwise hardly available
information. For anyone interested in regional organizations the Yearbook is
indispensable. The Yearbook makes an outstanding contribution to the promotion of "a closer unity between all like-minded countries of Europe." It
serves this worthy cause by directing attention to the work of European organizations and their potentialities, by gaining popular support for them, and
by providing a very useful forum for discussion of the pertinent problems of
European cooperation.
Gehard Bebr*
New Haveh, Connecticut
law and Morality. By LEON PETPAZYCKI. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press. 1955. Pp. xlvi, 335. Translated by Hugh W. Babb, with an introduction by Nicholas S. Timasheff. $7.50.
Here is a most stimulating and interesting book. Professor Babb, who has
very smoothly translated Petrazycki's treatise, and Professor Timasheff, who
ihas written an excellent introduction, merit the highest praise for rendering
accessible to American legal circles an outstanding work of one of the greatest
Slavic philosophers of law of all times.
Petrazycki was one of those rare geniuses who, aware of the shortcomings
of the recognized theories in his field of science, discarded all the traditional
,doctrines and approached the subject in his own way, building up a new coiherent theory capable of explaining all the phenomena under examination. He
contributed new ideas to methodology, psychology, sociology, philosophy in
general, and law.
In Law and Morality, Petrazycki analyzes the traditional concepts of law
and finds that they fail to explain adequately what legal phenomena are. He
is especially critical of those who regard laws as unilateral commands of the
government which must be abided by under threats of sanctions, and strongly
condemns the late nineteenth century German school of thought with
Ihering as its outstanding representative. Compulsion is not an ingredient of
-what we term law; the State may use it to enforce its legal order, yet it is a
misconception, Petrazycki says, to explain legal phenomena in terms of purely
external constraints and prohibitions. The application of force may be the
result of a violation of a legal duty, but it does not go to the essence of the
law itself. Says Petrazycki:
In order to save his life the traveler who has fallen into the hands of a
band of robbers can fulfill the commands of the more powerful and hand
over his purse, but probably even the robbers would not assert the presence
of an obligation as such.
Neither law nor morality has anything in common with commands and
prohibitions as such.' (Emphasis added.)
* Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School.
P.158.

1957]

BOOK REVIEWS

In the last sentence, Petrazycki's conviction that law and morality are closely
connected is reflected and emphasized. Legal and moral experiences are considered by him as two branches of ethics.
The novelty lies, chiefly, in this unorthodox classification; still, it extends
to all the underlying observations. From the outside world, Petrazycki brought
legal phenomena to the inward experiences of every individual. Just as the
moral ones, they happen in the consciousness of human beings, except in those
underdeveloped in this respect and incapable, wholly or partially, of perceiving
any sense of obligation. For example, there are individuals for whom larceny is
not a legal experience. The essence of morality as well as that of the law
lies in the conviction, in the minds of men, that they have some duties to fulfill towards other men, or that the others have some obligation towards them.
Processes occurring deep in the minds of individuals must be carefully analyzed.
Once the existence of duty is recognized, an "ethical impulsion" takes place.
But then, what is the difference between law and morality? Moral obligations are free; there are no corresponding claims helping the one to whom they
are owed; moral norms are unilateral. 3 In other words, ethical phenomena
which are purely imperative belong to the sphere of morality. On the other
hand, those which involve an obligation with a corresponding claim (right)
are termed legal. Law is nothing else than "imperative-attributive ethical
phenomena." 4 Needless to add, moral and legal experiences often overlap.5
It follows that the field of law is much broader than is usually recognized.
Besides phenomena which are traditionally considered legal, there are scores.
of situations in which law appears, although no jurist of the traditional school
of thinking would admit it. Law exists even where there are no "normative
facts" like statutes, customs or case-law. But, in a large majority of situations,
people are not familiar with codes and statutes; still, they realize the existence
of rights and duties. Under this broad conception of law, the rules of games
or of savoir vivre are legal;0 so are some mental processes of a child. 7 Another
field of legal experiences is the legal order of criminal organizations; as in
other cases of legal phenomena, its essence lies in the consciousness of the
members of criminal gangs. Their respective rights and duties are a reality
in their minds. The analysis of criminal groups, with an organization which
could be assimilated to a government endowed with all three powers8
executive, legislative, and judicial-is most interesting.
An interplay of legal experiences rooted deeply in the minds of the members
of a certain community, with the rules of law which are officially in force, can
take place in some primitive tribal or religious societies. The barbaric lawsof the inhabitants of a colony may be outlawed by the colonial power. They
continue, however, to exist as long as they "operate in the minds of certain
strata of the population." 9 Such minds often hold tenaciously to certain inveterate legal rules, like the right of blood-vengeance and the right of heads
2 P. 35.
3 P. 45.
4 Pp. 62, 90.
5 P. 61.
6 Pp. 64-65.
7 P. 69.
8 P. 72.
9 p. 74.
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of families to subject their wives and children to the punishment of death.
The result is that sometimes a dual system of law may continue to exist, even
though one of them imposes severe punishments "upon persons acting in accordance with the directions of their legal conscience in effectuating rights
sacred in their opinion qr in fulfilling a sacred legal duty."' 0
Petrazycki also recognizes legal experiences in the relations of human beings
and animals. He says:
If we are dealing with animals-with dogs, for example, requiring of
them certain actions or abstentions and punishing them for disobediencewe not infrequently experience imperative-attributive processes with regard
to them wherein they figure as subjects of obligations. 1
Here are some examples:
In those types of hunting where it is the accepted practice to reward
dogs that have contributed to the success-with certain parts of the slain
game, for example-hunters consider to which of the dogs the reward is
due, and disputes of a legal character arise: that is to say, a legal mentality
is at their basis. If the owner of an old horse, that has served him faithfully and truly when it was younger, nonchalantly let it starve, people
with a more subtle ethical (and particularly a more subtle legal)
conscience
2
would disapprove and even be indignant over the injustice.'
As other unorthodox examples of legal experiences, Petrazycki discusses
,obligations owed dead persons, such as preservation of their graves, 13 and
duties in respect to deities in primitive societies, such as furnishing them with
food and drink. 14
Naturally, the author realizes that from the point of view of contemporary
legal science, his approach is "a completely inadmissible scientific heresy: a
strange and incoherent fallacy."' 5 As pointed out, law is for him a much
broader field than for any jurist of the traditional schools. Legal experiences
as described by him, if containing "no references to outside authorities and
! . . dependent thereof," constitute the "intuitive law" as contrasted with the
positive law of a given society.' 6 The two may either conform to each other or
conflict, not only in primitive groups, but also in modem societies. Since legal
phenomena occur in the consciousness of individual people, intuitive law remains individual, and "there may be said to be as many intuitive laws as there
are individuals." However, many "problems of intuitive law find a similar
17
solution in the intuitive law of large circles or of broad categories of people.'
Even if positive and intuitive law concur, the foundation of legal principles.is
to be found in psychological processes; property rights, for instance, are based
-on the considerations "in the minds of the owners and of the others who
u8
ascribe rights of property to someone.'
Of course, the more that positive law concurs with intuitive law the better. If
10 p. 74.
1 P. 79.
12 Pp. 80-81.
13 P. 83.
14 p. 85.
15 p. 81.

16 Pp. 57, 224.
17 P. 226.
18 p. 126.
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a collision occurs, statutory law may become a complete fiasco and fail to
be observed. Again, statutes which were perfectly operative may lose their
authority with the evolution of the intuitive law. Numerous are the instances
of "cruel punitive statutes ceasing to function because of the influence of a
more gentle and humane intuitive law, which has changed."'19 Here, intuitive
law was more progressive than the positive one. And a similar situation existed
and exists today in hundreds of instances. Intuitive law either abrogates
positive law, or precedes it, with the change of social and ethical ideas; and
Petrazycki heartily believes that the human race is improving, in the course
of ages. He develops one of the examples I have cited:
In the earlier savage and crudely barbaric time, people were not inclined to ascribe and to respect the rights (most elementary from our point
of view) of the vast majority of other people-slaves, persons of another
race or tribe, and so forth-to say nothing of animals. However, the cultural process gradually but undeviatingly changes the human mind substantially for the better. And... it may be hoped that certain moral and
legal obligations with reference to animals will become the common ethical
property of all mankind, as is suggested by the abundant and animated
literature in defense of animals.2 °
In extreme cases of discordance between the intuitive and the positive law,
the conflict may culminate in bloody revolutions and violent coups d'etat.
Sometimes, however, positive law goes in advance of the intuitive law.
When serfdom was abolished, in Russia, under Alexander II, the new officially
declared relationship between squires and peasants did not gain immediate
recognition from a large number of either class. After some time elapsed, however, intuitive law followed the positive law.
Special attention is given by Petrazycki to the idea of justice. At all times,
justice was considered as "the loftiest guiding light," and attempts were made
to establish its relation to law. Justice is nothing else, says the author, than
"intuitive law in our sense." When we say "justice demands" or "according to
justice he is bound," we do not refer to positive law, and do not care whether
it is agreeable to our conclusions; we know that, in our consciousness, imperative-attributive experiences are evoked.3
Recognizing the fact that law and morality are interrelated and that law
should not be contrary to morality but rather based on moral considerations,
we may disagree with Petrazycki's classifications and his broad definition of
legal experiments, many of which we would not connect with law. However,
one merit of the great scholar cannot be denied: he dealt a blow to the
simplistic identification of the law with organized power to command, supplied
with force, and drew attention to the psychological processes which either are
a part of what we call law, or even constitute the law themselves. The
democratization of law follows. It is not created by the king or a few legislators; it is a reality existing in the minds of all individuals.
It is impossible to do justice either to this challenging treatise or to Timasheff's excellent introduction in a short review. In order to keep abreast of the
19 p. 251.
20 P. 82.
21 Pp. 241ff.
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development of the thought of Petrazycki, one must read carefully one sentence
after another; and a review of the book not only fails to answer hundreds of
questions arising in the mind of its reader, but also may be misleading by
its brevity. If these few observations seem to deal with an interesting work,
the book should be read in full. But it will not be very easy reading. Petrazycki uses his own vocabulary, and if one misses his explanation as to the
meaning of the terms, further passages of the book may be impossible to
be understood. The author does not abide by the usual legal and philosophical
parlance for two main reasons: first, he created his own concepts, previously
unknown, or invested the old ones with new life and significance; second,
while some of his Roman law studies were written in German, and while his
contributions to codification of the law were written in his native Polish
tongue, Law and Morality and most of his works in jurisprudence were written
in Russian, a language which he was never able to master perfectly. Most of
the terms of Latin origin found in his book are used by Petrazycki in their
Polish sense and are misleading in a Russian text. 22 This fact, of course,
greatly increased the difficulties met by Professor Babb in translating the study.
As in writing, Petrazycki's use of the Russian language in oral utterances
had many deficiencies; his accent was definitely Polish. 23 According to an
anecdote about the great scholar, one of Petrazycki's disciples expressed his
enthusiasm about the new approach to the law by his professor, and added that
the only unfortunate thing was that such a great man and the most famous
jurist of the University of St. Petersburg24 spoke poor Russian and used
many foreign words. "And who are you, my friend?" asked the master. Astonished, the student answered: "A student of the Faculty of Law of the University
of St. Petersburg." "Why," said Petrazycki, "did you use a single purely Russian word in answering my question?" In fact, all words were of foreign origin,
the name of the big town included. This conversation spread among the students, and he never heard observations of this kind again.
In spite of his difficulties with the language and his young age when he
assumed his duties as a member of the faculty, the contents of his lectures (the
lecture method was and is used in European law schools) must have been
fascinating since hundreds of listeners, students of law and of other schools,
often including faculty members, gathered in the largest classroom in order to
hear Petrazycki. Those who wanted to find a seat, had to come far in advance.
Some were standing, and the last arrivals were unable to enter the overcrowded
room.
The entire life of Petrazycki was unusual, from the beginning to the end,
just, as he was an unusual man: from the beginning-because although
he came from a well-to-do family of squires, he inherited little or nothing
because the estates of his family were confiscated by the Tsar as punishment for his family's participation in the unsuccessful uprising of the
Poles against Russia in 1863-1864; to the end-because he ended his
life by suicide in his residence near Warsaw in 1931. This tragic occurrence
might bring up the question whether Petrazycki's personality was well reflected
22 See examples given in the Translator's Notes.
23 Introduction, p. xxi.
24 Petrazycki taught at the University of St. Petersburg from 1898 to the revolution.
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in his writings, in which he appears a perfectly well-balanced philosopher,
taking life stoically as it comes, and believing in the progress of humanity, as
we have already observed. Even Timasheff suggests in his introduction 25 that
the suicide was caused by Petrazycki's pessimism over political matters. In
the light of information which I have from a reliable source (Mr. Andrzej
Plesniewicz, a close cousin of Petrazycki who loved him as his own son), the
explanation is quite different, and fits much better with the picture of Petrazycki the philosopher. At the close of his extraordinary career, he realized that
his mind was no longer as brilliant as previously and that he could not write
with the logic, ease and clarity of the past. He decided to leave this world
still at the summit of his glory, and to remain in the minds of those who
knew him as a man matched by few if any. Since his faith was not deep, religious scruples were slight. A notebook found after his death revealed that
Petrazycki prepared himself for his end over a period of three months, resolving
to complete during this time a few tasks which he had already undertaken.
The plan was carried out in every detail. On the date set, he invited some
members of his family and friends for lunch. Before they came, he shot himself, and upon their arrival, he was dead. They found excellent food prepared
-a real "stypa," a delicious meal taken at burials by those surviving, in
accordance with a centuries-old custom of ancient Poland.
The popularity that the teachings of Petrazycki gained in pre-revolutionary
Russia were an indication that the psychological school of law which he founded
would spread and gain world-wide attention. But political and military developments which upset Europe and the whole world in 1914-18 prevented this
from happening. Silent leges inter arma. The universe had more pressing
problems to solve during the general upheaval and period of reconstruction after
the disaster of the war. Even Petrazycki who intended to polish and further
develop his theories did not carry out this plan. After Poland recovered its
independence in 1918, he became Professor in the University of Warsaw and
devoted most of his time in reborn Poland to the urgent questions of codification of law for the country.
In Russia itself, after the revolution of Kerensky, recognition of the work of
Petrazycki was expressed in his appointment to the Supreme Court. However,
he refused to attend its sessions.2 6 A few months later, when the Communists
grabbed power, a misconceived application of his theories resulted in the enactment of a decree which abolished all laws of the Tsarist regime and instructed
the judges to administer justice in accordance with the intuitive law of the
working class-a system which could not and did not work properly, and was
abrogated a few years later. Then, owing to another misconception, Petrazycki
was branded as an "idealist'? and his doctrine was banned in the Soviet Union.27
A portion of the theories of Petrazycki are now being presented, nearly half
of a century late, to the American public. Let us hope that they will find the
attention they merit.
W. I. Wagner*
Notre Dame, Indiana
25

Introduction, p. xxxi.

26 Introduction, p. xxxi.

Introduction, p. xxxii.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
27

